ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) • DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2015.361 http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu ethics, including more specifically a more substantial reliance on morally real, unconstructed, basic virtues. 10 The crucial problem is that the most prominent forms of ethical and constitutional constructivism explicitly seek to set aside and minimize any reliance on any form of moral realism. We may take moral realism to be roughly the view that sound moral principles or virtues are "real," or largely discovered, rather than merely somehow adopted or invented to "solve" practical problems. But in the end, various basic virtues, as largely discovered-and thus "real"-are indispensable for a stable just constitutional regime, as Rawls and others envision it. Constitutional constructivism's setting aside of moral realism and downplaying of the role of morally real basic virtues in promoting the stability of a reasonably just regime thus crucially undermines constitutional constructivism.
The ideas of constructivism, and of constitutional constructivism in particular, quickly display complexity. 11 This Article offers some understanding of basic constructivist ideas below. 12 But first, the Article lays the groundwork for the potential importance of constitutional constructivism by presenting a major problem in constitutional adjudication to which it would seem that constitutional constructivism could present an attractive solution. 13 The clearest way to present the problem that constitutional construction might resolve involves a brief consideration of some famous language in the classic United States Supreme Court case of Calder v. Bull. 
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The precise intent of both Chase and Iredell remain contested even today. 22 But it does seem that "most observers . . . assume that Chase believed that the judiciary could invalidate state law on the basis of principles of 'reason' not embodied in the text of the United States Constitution," 23 whether this "natural law"
24 interpretation is ultimately sound or not. 25 Correspondingly, "Justice Iredell's opinion . . . is usually understood as a legal positivist argument against the idea that the Constitution incorporates principles of natural law or rights." 26 21 Calder, 3 U.S. at 399 (opinion of Iredell, J.). Actually, Iredell's language places no special limits on judicial creativity. As long as a judge does not rely on natural law thinking, the Iredellian judge can reach any desired plausible result in any case, perhaps by broader or narrower readings of, say, Equal Protection, substantive Due Process, or the First Amendment. There is thus little realistic practical difference in judicial constraining power between Chase's language and that of Iredell. 24 Id. 25 See id. at 1746 (presenting a dissenting view). 26 James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Natural Law and Natural Rights in Constitutional Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2285, 2286 (2001) . For further interpretation of Chase's and Iredell's opinions in Calder, see, for example, AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 521 n.15 (2012) ("Chase declared that American governments must honor not only the 'express' limitations on their own power found in the state and federal constitutions, but also 'great first principles of the social compact.'"); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 46 (1992) (referring to "the famous controversy between Chase and Iredell over the role of natural law in constitutional adjudication"); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 211 n.41 (1981) ("Calder, far from being authority for the view that natural law is enforceable in the name of the Constitution, appears on close reading as strong authority against it."); Edward B. Foley, The Bicentennial of Calder v. Bull: In Defense of a Democratic Middle Ground, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1599, 1599 (1998) (perceiving a debate over the role, if any, of "essential terms of a fair social contract").
Within the constitutional case law, the influence of Justice Chase's language is at least arguably reflected in, for example, Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 143, 143 (1810) (Johnson, J., concurring) ("I do not hesitate to declare that a state does not possess the power of revoking its own grants. But I do it on a general principle, on the reason and nature of things: a principle which will impose laws even on the In any event, the above-quoted language of Justices Chase 27 and Iredell 28 naturally prompts broad reflection on the bases of constitutional law and legitimacy. Particularly relevant to our purposes herein is the tendency to read Justice Chase's consistent references to a "social compact" 29 or social contract as equivalent to, or better expressed in terms of, "natural law." 30 Certainly, though, social contract theory and natural law theory are not even close to equivalent. The broad tradition of natural law theory need not invoke the idea of a social compact or contract, hypothetical or otherwise. 31 Rightly or wrongly, contemporary natural law and contemporary contractualist or, for that matter, constructivist theories 32 often explicitly seek to develop largely independently of each other.
Consider, from the contemporary natural law side, the basic formulation of Professor John Finnis' leading natural law view, according to which: [t] here is (i) a set of basic practical principles which indicate the basic forms of human flourishing as goods to be pursued and realized, and which are in one way or another used by everyone who considers what to do, however unsound his conclusions; and (ii) a set of basic methodological requirements of practical reasonableness (itself one of the basic forms of human flourishing) which deity."). See also Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 494, 494 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (referring to Justice Chase's "great first principles of the social compact" language in the constitutional takings context). 27 See supra text accompanying notes 20−21. 28 See supra text accompanying note 22. 29 See supra text accompanying notes 20−21. 30 See several of the contributions cited supra note 26; see also GEOFFREY R. STONE ET distinguish sound from unsound practical thinking and which, when all brought to bear, provide the criteria for distinguishing between acts that (always or in particular circumstances) are reasonable-all-things-considered, . . . i.e., between ways of acting that are morally right or morally wrong-thus enabling one to formulate (iii) a set of general moral standards.
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Let us now ask a rhetorical question: would the natural law theorist above somehow be bound to argue that the various basic ways of human flourishing are to be determined by some sort of actual or idealized popular agreement or contract on such a question? Suppose we were to agree, freely, fairly, unanimously, and after long debate, that watching gratuitous animal abuse videos 34 is central to a basic form of human flourishing. Would that agreement make it so? Would such an agreement require a corresponding adjustment in Finnis' natural law theory? 35 Presumably not. And the most obvious explanation is that for many natural law theorists, among a much wider range of moral theorists, some moral, legal, and particularly constitutional principles can be more or less true or false basically independent of any consensus, contract, or compact of interested parties. Such contracting parties can sometimes be, in this sense, genuinely mistaken about matters of ethics, social justice, and the moral element embodied in constitutional law. For convenience, we shall thus call this natural law view a form, among many other forms, of moral realism. 36 We can see some advantages for a society if there were a form of moral realism that clearly worked, crucially at a specific decisional level, or at the level of reasonably specific, meaningful moral rules or principles. We would then have available, if we chose to use it, a functioning moral compass, or even a moral Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) system, to guide us typically to morally right, or 33 For our purposes, though, the major problem at this point is that many thoughtful writers today do not find any form of moral realism to be convincing, whatever the advantages of a viable moral realism might have been. Those who reject moral realism, or largely "discoverable" moral truths, do so on a wide variety of grounds, and so we refer to such writers generally as moral non-realists. 39 Thus for many of our best thinkers, no form of natural law, or of moral realism in general, is credible, despite any advantages that might attend some form of moral realism.
This state of affairs-a common rejection of any form of moral realism, while appreciating the advantages that could flow from a valid and accepted moral realism-provides much of the motivation for many versions of moral, political, justice-oriented, and constitutional constructivism. Constructivism thus typically seeks first to set aside moral realism, as far as possible. Section III immediately below thus introduces 40 some forms of constructivism, and crucially explores the constructivist desire to set moral realism, including natural law theories, aside, while typically trying, as well, to retain some of the advantages of moral realism. After all, to its credit, moral realism at least aims at a meaningful form of legitimacy and seeks to avoid more or less arbitrary or under-justified moral decisions. 37 See supra text accompanying note 22. 38 This is not to suggest that the world is largely solving our moral or constitutional problems for us, without our invitation to do so, nor that this would be universally welcomed. 39 Setting aside all sorts of complications, a reasonable sense of the various moral non-realisms can be drawn from Richard Joyce, Moral Anti-Realism, STANFORD 
III. A BRIEF TOUR OF CONSTRUCTIVISM FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSES
In general, the main driving force behind constructivism is thus the desire to combine the best of two incompatible broad world views, in part through adopting procedures that result in the answers to practical problems of ethics and law, rather than trying to find the bases of those answers somehow already etched into nature or the universe. One recent reviewer crucially characterizes constructivism "as trying to 'split the difference' between robust realism about morality . . . and realism's [non-realist] opponents." 41 As the reviewer observes, though, "[e]ating your cake and having it too is a great thing when you can pull it off, but trying to do so exposes such positions to the problems of both alternatives." 42 Seeking the best elements of two worlds does not guarantee success in doing so.
Thus constructivists about morality, unlike moral realists, "doubt or deny that there are distinctively moral facts or properties . . . which can be discovered or intuited and will provide foundations for ethics." 43 To this extent, constructivists thus seek to avoid the problems associated with moral realist theories. 44 But constructivists also do not entirely abandon the idea of distinctively justifying constructivism in general, or its practical application in ethics, social justice, constitutional law, or other fields. 45 Some constructivists even talk in terms of "objectively" justified outcomes of constructivist procedures. 46 47 See Bagnoli, Constructivism in Methaethics, supra note 46, at 1; Buckley, supra note 46, at 672. Additionally, see Professor Ronald Dworkin on moral constructivism, to the effect that "[o]n this view, moral judgments are constructed, not discovered: they issue from an intellectual device adapted to confront practical, not theoretical problems." RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 63 (2011) (referring to the Kantian Categorical Imperative "universalization" technique as well as to John Rawls' "original position" and "veil of ignorance" device). 48 See LeBar, supra note 41; ONORA O'NEILL, CONSTRUCTIONS OF REASON: EXPLORATIONS OF KANT'S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 206 (1989) (referring to critiques, in this respect, of Rawlsian constructivism at an early stage, and aspiring to avoid this problem in her own version of moral constructivism). Thinking about constructivism in general, however, can carry us only so far. It is possible that what we can rightly say about one version or level of constructivism may not be true of another. In particular, constructivism as applied, in one way or another, at the constitutional level 49 may, for all we yet know, have distinctive advantages or disadvantages over related levels of constructivist theory.
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Constructivism can, as we have already begun to see, take many forms. 51 The forms may vary as to their scope or focus. Thus "we may distinguish between local and global constructivist views."
52 Contractual elements of constructivism may be either emphasized, 53 or else severely downplayed. 54 The crucial proceduralist elements of constructivism may also be supplemented, to a greater or lesser degree, 49 See, e.g., James E. 50 See Fleming, supra note 49, at 281−83 (distinguishing Rawlsian constitutional constructivism from a broader Rawlsian political constructivism); id. at 297 ("The idea is that the Constitution, conceived as an embodiment of fair terms of social cooperation on the basis of mutual respect and trust among free and equal citizens, provides a shared public basis for reasonable political agreement in our morally pluralistic constitutional democracy."). 51 For some sources on the evolution of Rawls' interest and focus, see supra note 5. (2012)) (distinguishing among constructivist approaches based on the breadth or scope of the domain being addressed); see also Laurence, supra note 46 (construing Scanlon's and Rawls' constructivism as relatively "local" in their scope or domain). 53 See, e.g., Timmons, supra note 51, at 391 (characterizing Scanlon's approach); Ronald Milo, Contractarian Constructivism, 92 J. PHIL. 181, 184 (1995) . 54 See, e.g., O'Neill, Constructivism, supra note 43. There may be some tendency for those relying heavily on contractualism to introduce (additional) non-contractualist elements to fend off criticisms of their approach. with nonprocedural substantive assumptions and considerations. 55 The degree to which constructivism in general may require supplementation with nonconstructivist elements will be controversial.
We can also attempt specifically to distinguish, say, ethical or moral constructivism from political constructivism. 56 The idea of applying constructivism to the political realm is certainly popular. 57 Attempts are sometimes made, as well, to focus constructivist methods not so much on ethics, or even on politics, but on some understanding of an idea of justice, 58 or of social justice. 59 Most important for our purposes, constructivism can also be applied in narrower and distinctly institutional contexts, as at the constitutional or judicial levels. 60 67 with the Rawlsian veil of ignorance being partially and progressively lifted at each of the latter stages. 68 Let us now turn to Rawls' version of constructivism.
IV. SOME ELEMENTS OF RAWLS' DOMINANT VERSION OF GENERAL AND SPECIFICALLY CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

A. Introductory Background
The most sensible approach to constitutional constructivism in particular involves a focus on John Rawls' dominant approach. As Rawls adapted to critical commentary over the years, Rawlsian constructivism in general increased in both subtlety and in sheer complexity. No brief account can, at this point, do it justice. Herein, we address only as much of Rawls' approach as is necessary to develop a responsible critique thereof, with an eye secondarily toward the possibility of other, non-Rawlsian forms of constitutional constructivism.
Rawls, as we saw above, 69 seeks to distinguish the "first stage" basic principles of justice from the "later stage" provisions of the constitution of a reasonably just society. 70 In turn, the constitution itself, or the fruits of a constitutional convention, 71 are then to be specifically distinguished from the separate stage of the processes and outcomes of constitutional adjudication.
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Crucially for our purposes, the outcomes reached at each separate Rawlsian stage are intended to be not merely abstractly appealing, but to be reasonably stable in practice over generations.
73 65 See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 61, at 397. 66 See id. 67 See id. at 397−98. 68 See id. at 398. For a brief summary of this Rawlsian four stage constructivist process, see Leif Werner, John Rawls § 4.9, http://stanford.library.usyd.edu.au/entries/rawls/. 69 See supra notes 62−69 and accompanying text. 70 See supra notes 65−66 and accompanying text. 71 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 72 See supra notes 66, 68 and accompanying text. 73 See, e.g., RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 61, at 140−44; RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 62, at 180−202. Without providing a detailed description of Rawls' constructivism at any of the four stages, we can nonetheless start with Rawls' famous two principles of justice, as they are thought to emerge from the "first stage" original position. 74 These principles, in their order of ethical priority, hold that (a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; and (b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle).
75
In turn, the later constitutional, legislative, and adjudicative stages are then to have a complex and subtle relation to these two basic principles, and among one another.
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A broad critique of even these two basic "first stage" principles of justice would be a treatise in itself. 77 Our focus herein is instead primarily on Rawlsian constructivism at the constitutional level, and then only to make a few key points of general interest. The other stages of Rawlsian constructivism will be referred to only for limited purposes. We begin to explore some inescapable problems for Rawlsian constructivism below.
B. The Key Rawlsian Ideas as Unfortunately "Essentially
Contested"
The first problem begins with the fact that at every stage of Rawlsian constructivism, concrete meanings for the basic ideas of freedom, liberty, and equality must be constructed. Rawls has complex, multifaceted purposes for choosing from among the various possible meanings of these and other crucial 74 For the original formulation, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § § 11-14 (1972). 75 RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 62, § 13, at 42−43. 76 See supra notes 62-74 and accompanying text. terms. 78 But even if we assume that Rawls' constructive methodology itself drives his understanding of these key terms, the meaning of each of these terms for every decision maker unfortunately remains "essentially contested." 79 The problem is that once Rawls provides the choice-makers, at any of the four stages, with enough information to make a meaningful choice regarding, say, questions of liberty or equality, a classic "essential contestability" problem unavoidably arises. Roughly, the essential contestability problem is that even if we all choose to adopt Rawls' most basic aims, there will arise unresolvable basic disputes as to the practical meaning and implications of the terms at issue. Those disputes as to meaning cannot be resolved by thinking harder about those terms, or by further good faith discussions.
As merely one concrete "essential contestability" example, consider the views not of a libertarian, of a classical liberal, or of any sort of conservative, but of the basically politically sympathetic Professor Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin, quite unlike Rawls, 80 denies that there are any basic conflicts between the values of freedom and equality in their highest and best senses. 81 Specifically, Dworkin argues that "liberty isn't the freedom to do whatever you might want to do; it's freedom to do whatever you like so long as you respect the moral rights of others." 82 On this view, liberty thus cannot possibly involve violating the moral rights of another person. Clearly, whether Rawls can, in contrast, define liberty completely independently of any moral rights of others or not, there is no neutral, objectively right answer to the conflict between Rawls and Dworkin on this crucial point. This inherent lack of closure as to meaning plagues Rawlsian constructivism on the similarly essentially contested ideas of equality of opportunity, of the value of liberty, and elsewhere.
C. Some Incoherence Among the Four Constructed Rawlsian Stages
A second and related problem is that Rawls' attempts at moderate, realistic, pragmatic, restrained, and stability-inducing constructivist arguments actually create problems of incoherence within his overall account of the four stages as severe as some of his bolder constructivist steps.
Consider, for example, Rawls' insistence that the first principle of justice mentioned above, that of protecting equal liberties and their worth, 84 must be enshrined and entrenched at the later stage of constitution-making, 85 but that for various reasons, 86 the second principle of justice, 87 addressing social and economic opportunities and inequalities, need not be similarly written into the constitution.
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What may initially seem like a Rawlsian nod to pragmatism, moderation, consensus-building, or stability actually dissolves, however, into incoherence.
There is initial plausibility to this Rawlsian arrangement, since the first principle of justice does explicitly take moral precedence over the second. constructed, Rawls' theory is in the position of constitutionally protecting equal basic liberties and their value for all, along a publicly provided social minimum for all persons, and the equal protection of rights under the law, or equal protection.
But Rawls then very explicitly does not necessarily protect, at the same constitutional stage, "fair equality of opportunity" 90 as embodied in the second principle of justice.
91 Fair equality of opportunity, but not equal liberties and their value or the equal protection of rights under the law, is thus left vulnerable to the contingencies of possible legislative, sub-constitutional level enactments.
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While there is a formalistic rigor about these Rawlsian constructivist moves, their overall practical coherence is extremely doubtful at best. What would it look like, on Rawls' constructivist approach, to constitutionally guarantee the equal provision of basic liberties and their value, and the equal protection of the laws, but at the same time to deny constitutional protection to fair equality of opportunity? On almost any sensible set of definitions of the key terms, this combination of constitutional guarantees and their lack makes little sense. What would it look like to arbitrarily bar a group from, say, some important work, or from some important educational option, while at the same time supposedly upholding that group's equal protection rights, along with the fair value of their basic liberties? This combination of rights, and lack of rights, is meaningless. If this incoherent state of affairs were even imaginable, how likely is it that fair-minded legislators, citizens, or judges could, under any set any procedures, remotely approach free agreement on whether this curious combination of rights had been met in various cases?
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D. The Realistic Inseparability of the Four Supposedly Distinct Rawlsian Constructivist Stages
A third, and again closely related, problem is illustrated by Rawls' attempt to distinguish between, and assign different constructed functions to, the four different 90 See id. at 42, 43. 91 See sources cited supra note 86; see also Fleming, supra note 49, at 286. 92 See Fleming, supra note 49, at 286. 93 For general background, see the various opinions, especially that of Justice Sotomayor, dissenting, in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). We might also wonder whether this odd implication of Rawls' constructivism would add to the prospects of genuine social stability as much as to subtract therefrom. sequential stages of public decision making referred to above. 94 The four Rawlsian constructivist stages are, inescapably, inseparable.
Of most direct relevance for our purposes is the distinction Rawls seeks to draw between a hypothetical idealized constitutional convention or a constitutional drafting stage 95 on the one hand, and then a separate later stage of more or less idealized judicial interpretation of the previously adopted constitution. 96 For some purposes, certainly there is little harm in drawing this thoroughly familiar distinction. Problems arise, however, when Rawls invests too heavily in this distinction between the constitution itself and constitutional case adjudication, as a substantive or genuinely functional, rather than a largely formal, distinction.
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The meaningfulness of any clear, functional distinction between the Constitution itself and a court's adjudication of a constitutional case, on whatever theory, has rightly been implicitly called into question by a number of scholars.
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There is thus little point in Rawls' explicitly constructing one set of informational limits, constraints and tasks for one stage, and another set for the another "later" stage, 99 if in the most interesting cases the two stages cannot realistically be disentangled.
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For the sake of clarity, let us briefly consider this stage-inseparability problem at the level of constitutional case law adjudication. Do the major historical constitutional cases consistently reflect a practical distinction between either the product of a constitution or a constitutional convention on the one hand, and constitutional case adjudication on the other? Would this distinction really become substantially clearer if all of Rawls' constructivist constraints, including the 94 See supra notes 62−77 and accompanying text. 95 See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 61, at 397. 96 See id. at 398. 97 See id. 98 In some or all of these cases, the Supreme Court may have failed to justify the outcome through the use of what is called Rawlsian "public reason." 114 But if so, this would not rescue the Rawlsian supposed functional distinction between the constitution itself and the courts. It is difficult to imagine all of the great issues of the day being candidly and meaningfully judicially addressed, let alone justly resolved, without even implicit judicial reliance on metaphysical views that are not universally shared among reasonable persons. Nor is it easy to imagine an adopted constitutional text with no implied reliance on metaphysics unshared among reasonable persons. But even a constitution and a series of constitutional adjudications in strict accordance with shared metaphysical views, held on identical grounds, would inevitably merge in ways sufficient to render unrealistic the idea of different Rawlsian constructivist standards for a constitutional stage and a constitutional adjudication stage.
E. The Crucial Problem of Constructed Constitutional Stability and the Role of Broad Basic Virtues
A fourth, and for our purposes most important, problem focuses on whether Rawls' constitutional constructivism in particular has the resources to sustain itself in practice over a substantial period of time. Our focus here is not on the destabilizing possibility of some external threat, natural disaster, or on uncompromising political or religious extremists, but on ordinary constitutional and related governmental processes and outcomes. We refer here to matters such as constitutional regime performance, regime legitimacy, regime authority, and public trust over the course of time, as such matters in practice might play out. Briefly put, this is a problem of constitutional constructivist regime stability over time. To loosely paraphrase Rousseau, we shall, for purposes of investigating regime 114 For our purposes, "public reason" would exclude political outcomes justified only through some comprehensive metaphysical, religious, or other such perspectives not generally shared by, or agreed with on any grounds by, the conscientious citizenry. 
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The temptation for the constitutional constructivist, especially given the underlying Rawlsian vision of justice as fairness, is to assume that constitutional and regime legitimacy, authority, public trust, and stability should follow readily from the constructed justice of the system, at least if the citizenry displays a sufficient commitment to public reasonableness, and a certain measure of Rawlsian civic virtue.
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The basic problem, though, is that over the long term, the stability of any form of constructivist constitutionalism is likely to depend, parasitically, on a largely unacknowledged, deeper, and more extensive role for a number of inescapably vital and familiar broad basic virtues, whose status as broad virtues is far more "real" and deeply objective than merely consensual or constructed.
This concern does not depend upon any unusual definitions of a regime or constitutional legitimacy, authority, public trust, or stability. 117 Any standard definitions will suffice. Almost at random, we could say that legitimacy involves "the widespread public belief that the society's governing institutions and political authorities are worthy of support," 118 in ways arguably bearing on broad political 115 122 See supra notes 62−69 and accompanying text. 123 See, e.g., DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM 315 (20th anniv. ed. 1996) (referring to a "loss of civitas, which makes respect for the law possible"). 124 See, for example, the widespread sense that the nation is headed "off on the wrong track" as opposed to "the right direction," with at best limited public confidence levels in most major institutions, including the Supreme Court. HART RESEARCH ASSOCIATES/PUBLIC OPINION STRATEGIES, STUDY #15028, at 2 (Jan. 14-17, 2015), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJNBCpoll 01192014.pdf. 125 See, e.g., BELL, supra note 123, at 318 ("Every generation of Americans had expected that they would build a better life for their children than they themselves had. This may no longer be the case. The main concern is not that a Rawlsian constitutional or broadly political constructivism would inherit any preexisting public pessimism, or either generalized or specifically intergenerational distrust. We can assume that Rawlsian constructivism, in practice, could inherit a clean slate, indeed universal popularity, in every respect. Our focus is instead on whether a Rawlsian constitutional constructivist regime would likely retain its integrity, coherence, and the assumed initial public support, in reasonably stable fashion, in the long term.
Rawls recognizes that even if we metaphorically assume away any citizens who fundamentally reject the most basic assumptions of Rawlsian justice, the principles of justice are not automatically self-implementing or self-sustaining over time. Rawls appreciates that a constitutionally and otherwise just and stable society requires certain sorts of public or civic virtue among public officials and the citizenry. Thus there must be "a spirit of compromise and a readiness to meet others halfway."
127 Rawls also emphasizes "the virtues of fair social cooperation such as the virtues of civility and tolerance, of reasonableness and the sense of fairness."
128 Each comprehensive or metaphysically-motivated philosophical or religious group may emphasize particular virtues, 129 and various associations, organizations, and groups may also emphasize particular virtues, 130 but beyond the above "officially endorsed" Rawlsian civic virtues focusing on cooperative mutual tolerance 131 and mutual civic trust, 132 the risk looms, according to Rawls, of 126 See, e.g., BELL, supra note 123, at 315 (referring to "a rising distrust of politics-and even of the political system"); 127 RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 62, at 116−18. Rawls would seem to implicitly require us to display the virtue of practical wisdom in deciding who is and who is not to be met "halfway" or even part of the way, or fully accommodated, on which issues, and in deciding what constitutes "halfway," statically or over time. It is important that such decisions not be impaired by unnecessarily poor judgment or by the vice of public cowardice.
128 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 61, at 194; see also id. at 195 n.29 (referring to the political or civic virtues as necessary for "a just and stable constitutional regime"). 129 See id. at 195. 130 See id. 131 See id. establishing what is called a "perfectionist" 133 state, in which some particular controversial view or views of a life well-lived is imposed on the citizenry.
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Rawls thus seeks what he takes to be a middle ground between two extremes: a just society that refuses to sustain itself even by socializing the citizenry to its own most basic principles 135 and that ignores the potential for the principles of justice to themselves further promote the sustaining civic virtues, 136 and, at the other extreme, a society that risks illiberal "perfectionism" by building certain more or less controversial purported virtues into the governmental basic structure.
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The crucial question is thus whether Rawls' "thin" conception of, and corresponding role for, his civic virtues sufficiently promotes the long-term stability of the constitutionally and otherwise just society. Rawls sees the basic principles of justice, and a proper socialization to the "thin" civic virtues above, as mutually supportive. 138 And he again seeks to avoid an otherwise just society that builds controversial "thicker" conceptions of virtue-perhaps like that of the martialized honor-based Sparta of Socrates' time 139 -into its governing structure. All else equal, though, is this really a sufficient role for virtues and virtue-thinking in a stable, just society?
There is good reason to suspect not. And this is a central problem not only for Rawlsian constitutional constructivism, but for any constitutional constructivism that seeks as far as possible to set moral realism aside. 140 Over the long term, the "thin" civic virtues referred to by Rawls, even if widely inculcated, are not enough for the reasonable stability of a just society. The Rawlsian just constitution, in particular, would instead require the widespread, active support of a range of 132 See id; RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 62, at 117. 133 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 61, at 195. 134 See id. 135 See RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 62, at 124−25. 136 See id. at 126. 137 See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 61, at 195. 138 See supra note 137 and accompanying text. The moral realism and deep moral objectivity of the basic virtues that constructivism disastrously underplays requires brief further discussion below. 142 But first, let us consider how the very process of recognizing and applying the "thin" Rawlsian civic virtues itself actually depends, in unacknowledged ways, on more deeply moral objective underlying basic virtues.
Consider, for example, the Rawlsian civic virtues of a willingness, where justice itself is not put at risk, to compromise, 143 to meet others halfway, 144 or to display tolerance. 145 We will here simply assume these qualities to be virtues, in their proper place and proper measure. But once we make this concession, the deeper problem then comes into view: Knowing when and how, or how far, to carry these thin Rawlsian civic virtues inescapably requires other, more deeply objective virtues that unavoidably carry us back into moral realism. The proper role and implementation of the Rawlsian civic virtues in actual practice will not be selfevident, especially where claims to arguable constitutional rights come into conflict, or where the scope of constitutional rights is far from clear. 146 There may well be some role for merely constructed principles in deciding such inherently inexact matters. But the crucial role in deciding all such matters must be played by classic broad objective virtues, including, in particular, the classic general virtue of practical wisdom. 147 And the crucial role of practical wisdom or broad prudence not 141 154 Let us notice, though, the monumental difference between, say, Rawls' two basic rules or principles of justice, 155 and the classic virtue-based account of justice as, instead, a personal disposition to accord to every other person neither more nor less than what is due to that person. 156 But let us now suppose that Rawlsian constitutional constructivism were modified in such a way as to provide a more substantial role for one or more of the classic basic virtues, as appropriately broadly defined. What would then be the cost of doing so, in specifically constructivist terms?
Importantly, it would then become very difficult for the constitutional constructivist to continue to claim to be largely declining to take sides on questions of moral realism and non-realism. 157 In the sense in which we intend them, broad virtues 158 such as prudence or practical wisdom, fortitude, temperance as a reasonable degree of self-restraint over time, and justice as defined above 159 seem more recognizable than merely invented, and thus understood best in terms of moral realism. It may well be that one or more of even the "thin" Rawlsian civic virtues 160 should also best be thought of in moral realist, non-constructed terms.
The main point is instead that classic virtues such as, say, fortitude or practical wisdom at basic levels seem most naturally understood on some inescapably moral realist approach. Any society could, technically, choose to define fortitude, as a supposed virtue, in terms of panicking before any obstacle, or as denying the reality of any obstacle, or in any other obviously self-defeating way. Practical wisdom could similarly be defined in terms of adopting popular but self- 155 See supra text accompanying note 76. 156 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 155. 157 See supra notes 1, 42−50 and accompanying text, and notes 37, 40 and their accompanying text (discussing forms of moral non-realism). 158 See supra notes 148−50 and accompanying text. 159 See supra notes 155, 157 and accompanying text. 160 See supra text accompanying notes 128−29. destructive illusion, or as a purely arbitrary conventional notion, or in terms almost entirely of emotion or attitudes rather than belief, or even in terms of beliefs inescapably relying on obvious fiction. 161 And there is obviously some role for cultural variation, at some level, in the concrete meanings of the virtues. But when the chips are down, we think of the basic virtues as more or less genuinely recognizable, given our nature, our basic aims, our basic capacities and vulnerabilities, and our basic circumstances, rather than as largely subjective or ultimately arbitrary. They are recognized, far more than invented, at a broad level, even though they relativistically vary across different cultures.
Moral realism regarding basic virtues is thus much more difficult to set aside than constructivists typically assume. But do constructivists, including Rawls, really sacrifice much, particularly in terms of the stability of the constitutionally just society, by downplaying the role of various classic, objective basic virtues? Practical wisdom, for example, inescapably does seem to be among the virtues to be valued in a just government official, as well as in the citizenry. But let us focus, more narrowly, as a specific test, on merely one important and long-standing element of Rawlsian justice, the question of a just saving rate across generations. 162 The Rawlsian principle of a just saving rate unavoidably has significant equal protection and other constitutional implications. 163 On Rawls' theory, the initial choosers are to select a principle establishing a rate of real societal saving, for the sake of justice, but without those choosers knowing their own historical position, and thus without an incentive to free-ride or to exploit earlier or later generations unjustly. 164 What is chosen is not a particular numerical saving rate, applicable for all relevant generations, forward and backward in time, but a broader principle to determine a just saving rate under relevant circumstances. A just saving rate itself is thus, as the term suggests, a matter of a just principle, as then applied under variant historical and economic circumstances. The rate itself may thus vary across generations. As Rawls expresses the point, "[r]eal saving is required only for reasons of justice: that is, to make possible the conditions needed to establish and to preserve a just basic structure over time." 166 The aim is thus at justice, rather than at even modest economic development beyond or independent of justice, 167 whatever additional savings a society may choose for other reasons. 168 Thus on Rawls' approach, once just institutions have been established, and provision has been made for financially sustaining those just institutions, "net real savings may fall to zero."
169 Rawls explicitly notes in particular that "[w]e do not want to rule out Mill's idea of a society in a just stationary state where (real) capital accumulation may cease." 170 We have no serious objection here to Rawls' just saving doctrine itself, or to anything like it. 171 The problem is instead that the just saving doctrine, like every other Rawlsian principle, must be rendered concrete, refined, implemented, and administered at all relevant stages and levels, under circumstances of inevitable complexity, temptation to subconscious bias, and uncertainty. Under just such generations to have followed, no matter how far back in time. Since no generation knows its place among the generations, this implies that all later generations, including the present one, are to follow it.
Id. at 160. 166 Id. at 159. 167 See id. 168 See id. Imagine, for example, a society on the verge of a unique technological breakthrough, or of some preventable catastrophe. 169 Id. 170 
Id.
171 Someone who thinks of either personal or civilizational development as linked to justice could endorse a saving principle oriented more toward genuine, humane, egalitarian, environmentally-friendly growth, perhaps to enhance the options for genuine self-realization for a greater number of persons, without exploiting those persons who find themselves in an early generation. The idea of saving on behalf of future generations can be seen as a vital opportunity, deeply fulfilling in itself, rather than as a burden to be borne. The adoption and complex implementation of a just saving rate for the sake of future generations will often require not only the thin Rawlsian civic virtues, but substantial measures of what we might call Aristotelian or simply classic practical wisdom, 173 along with the classic virtue of temperance, in the broad sense of a sustained disposition to exercise a reasonable degree of self-restraint, individually and collectively. 174 The heart of the practical problem is this: we can genuinely agree on a particular saving rate for the future, but then more or less innocently adopt systematically biased implementing policies and technical calculations 175 that make the actual achievement of anything like the targeted saving rate highly unlikely. 176 The Rawlsian thin civic virtues, against the likely background socialization, thus cannot carry an agreed saving rate into actual practice with any real assurance. negative saving rate, with the benefits largely accruing to current generations, and the costs borne largely by future generations.
Someone might say that "indebtedness" is merely a social construct, just as money and credit themselves are social constructs. 185 But the major consequences of such social constructs are nonetheless robustly real and deeply objective. The virtues and vices that discourage or encourage the creation of such social constructs are similarly morally real in their nature and status, and not merely invented, arbitrarily or emotionally chosen, or basically different for each culture. Now, it seems highly unlikely that routinely running up enormousrealistically, not genuinely and fully repayable-public debt in the absence of any genuine emergency could meet Rawlsian requirements for a fair saving rate 186 with regard to the most directly affected future generations. The point is certainly not that Rawlsian constitutional constructivism would on its own explicit theory endorse the fiscal and budgeting policies irresponsibly adopted in practice over the past generation or two.
Instead, the point is that adopting and implementing a just saving rate inevitably involves many systematic unconscious biases and exploitable uncertainties that must be responded to, at the constitutional and other levels, with or without practical wisdom and other genuine, unconstructed virtues. 187 These are genuine, objective virtues upon which Rawls cannot meaningfully rely without abandoning his constitutional constructivism. 188 But if such virtues were properly manifested, they might discipline our conscious or sub-conscious temptations, at all levels, to self-indulgence in implementing a just saving rate. And, even more importantly, a parallel story could be told about nearly every other constitutionally relevant feature of Rawlsian justice, including inequalities of opportunity, or 185 See SEARLE, supra note 1. 186 See supra notes 163−71 and accompanying text. 187 We need take no position on how practical wisdom may be related to any of the other genuine, deeply objective, basically unconstructed virtues. 188 Rawls does presume what he refers to as the "moral power" to devise, apply, and comply with the basic principles of justice. See, e.g., RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 61, at 103, 315−16. But Rawls clearly does not intend to thereby casually wave away problems of implementation and stability. inequalities of access to the Rawlsian basic goods. 189 Real and stable just results require real, non-constructed basic virtues.
In the end, Rawls' account of the stability of a just society unfortunately relies largely on his thin civic virtues, and on the assumed socializing effects of growing up and living one's life under a regime of just rules, principles, and institutions. 190 It is certainly fair to imagine that living much of one's life under a regime that meets Rawls' criteria for justice would indeed tend to "normalize" and win allegiance toward 191 such a regime. But Rawls offers us no reason why familiar subconscious biases, cognitive and emotional, 192 in favor of those we most closely identify with would not be systematically manifested even in good faith attempts to stably implement Rawlsian justice. The basic virtues, morally real at their fundamental level, would have to play some stabilizing role.
What we might call the Rawlsian "transitional problem" is this: there will inevitably be a distinct need for the morally real virtue of practical wisdom, along with allied real virtues, during the extended process of historically transitioning from an unjust to a stable just society in the first place. And there are crucial limits to any society's ability, in such a context, to culturally redefine or revalue what counts as practical wisdom, or its lack. During any such transition from an unjust to a just society, and to the latter's stability, the existing socialization processes and allegiances may hinder as much as help. Especially throughout this transitional period, as policy implementation options and uncertainties are initially confronted at every level, reliance on the classic, fundamentally non-constructed virtues will be indispensable for Rawlsian constitutional regime stability. 
V. CONCLUSION: CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AS REALISTICALLY UNSUSTAINABLE
In light of the dominance, complexity, and sophistication of John Rawls' path-breaking work over a period of decades, a negative verdict on his leading version constitutional constructivism should not be lightly reached. Still, Rawlsian constitutional constructivism should not be immune from the kinds of critique Rawls' overall theory continues to undergo.
We have particularly emphasized the important but unacknowledged role of deeply real, and not merely thin or constructed, virtues in implementing, nurturing, and stabilizing a just Rawlsian regime over time. The problem for constitutional constructivism would persist even if no one held an extremist, intolerant, or illiberal comprehensive view of politics, morality, or religion.
The importance of the genuine, basically unconstructed classic virtues in sustaining a Rawlsian just society begins with common sense observations. Consider, for example, the observations of a well-respected virtue-oriented theorist, Professor Michael Slote, who analogizes "the laws, customs, and institutions of a given society" 194 to the less enduring actions of a particular person, where both sorts of actions reflect motivations 195 with one combination or another of virtues and vices. 196 Laws and institutions, including those of Rawlsian constructivism, reflect not merely thin civic virtues and knowledge, or the lack thereof, but basic and real virtues, or, unfortunately, the lack thereof.
197
Professor Slote then argues that " [w] here the writing and implementation of a constitution . . . is motivated by greed or indifference to others, the constitution is not a just one."
198 Thus for Professor Slote, "the justice of a given society cannot virtues as sources of stability and of other benefits for a state") (emphasis added). For a mere introduction to some relations among virtues, institutional instability, and crucial unrecognized collective action problems, see 
